

Main Submitter: Germany

Co-submitter: Ghana, Australia

Signatories: Japan, France, Singapore, Somalia, Finland, Croatia, Canada, Azerbaijan, Kenya, Austria, South Korea, Türkiye, Mexico, Bolivia, Lebanon, Greece, Cuba, Philippines, Ireland, Netherlands, Armenia, Estonia, Brazil, India, Qatar, Brazil

Topic: Preventing the use of chemical and biological weapons by states in defiance of international prohibition.

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,

Aware that advancements in biotechnology and vaccine development during the COVID-19 pandemic revealed dual-use potentials that could be weaponized by States for biological warfare purposes,

Recalling that it is a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention (“CWC”) and the Biological Weapons Convention (“BWC”), and stands for collective multi-state non-proliferation,

Noting with appreciation The Federal Republic of Germany’s role in the carrying out of the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, including assistance provided to the Russian Federation after the entry into force of the CWC,

Deeply concerned by indications of possible undeclared, non-compliant, undestroyed biological weapons in some States that constitute serious violations of international law and undermine trust in the complicit States’ behalfs,

1. *Calls upon* all Member States to strengthen global collaboration to mitigate the manufacturing and use of chemical and biological weapons, in ways such as but not limited to;
 - a. Motivating all nations to approve the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) with aims such as, but not limited to:
 - i. Encouraging international disarmament and peace through chemical and biological safety,
 - ii. Initiating national systems to monitor whether countries are following disarmament rules, and
 - iii. Promoting accountability and transparency in how countries handle chemical and biological materials,
 - b. Supporting efforts to oversee the execution of chemical and biological weapon bans through methods such as but not limited to:
 - i. Helping developing countries in embracing safety and disarmament quality,
 - ii. Providing technical information to Member States in order to improve countries’ abilities to detect and answer to chemical and biological threats, and
 - iii. Recommending peaceful implementations of chemical and biological sciences,
2. *Encourages* all States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention to strengthen domestic implementation through updated national legislation and regulatory frameworks through methods including, but not limited to:
 - a. Creating national oversight bodies responsible for the auditing private and governmental institutions that are engaged in high-risk chemical or biological activity by,

- i. Ensuring that no government organizations are developing, producing, or stockpiling any new biological or chemical weapons, and
 - ii. Reporting any found stockpiles for destruction to any appropriate domestic body for immediate destruction,
- b. Classifying and keep classified any dual-use biological agents or technologies that could be used in biological warfare settings,
- c. Implementing penalties for organizations that maintain stockpiles of, produce, or develop biological or chemical weapon stockpiles,
 - i. Penalties could include but be not limited to:
 - 1. Publishing a list of non-compliant states,
 - 2. Mandating additional periodic reporting for Member States that fail to comply with the convention's guidelines, and
 - 3. Recommending that the security council consider sanctions, arm embargoes, asset freezes, travel bans, and/or trade restrictions,

3. *Calls for the establishment of a voluntary Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - World Health Organization Joint Task Force on Dual-Use Biotechnology* that would engage in practices such as, but not restricted to:

- d. Accessing public health experts and gaining external credibility for voluntarily joining and complying with the task force's advisements,
- e. Conducting reports on emerging biological technologies that may bear dual-use capabilities provide scientific analyses on the risks of the potential for weaponization of these technologies, and
- f. Advising developing states, especially signatories of the CWC and BWC in following standards to be deemed compliant with the aforementioned conventions,

4. *Urges* Member States to construct a *Multinational Prevention and Detection Architecture* (MPDA) aimed at identifying, monitoring, and intercepting chemical and biological weapons activity prior to deployment, by implementing:

- a. Regional Chemical-Pathogen Watch Parties, consisting of:
 - i. the installation of fixed, high-sensitivity sensor stations along major maritime ports, land transit corridors, and industrial zones to enable continuous real-time detection of abnormal chemical and aerosolized biological signatures, and
 - ii. the establishment of municipal and national bio-alert hubs that integrate hospital emergency triage data, pharmaceutical demand spikes, and environmental monitoring systems to enable early outbreak and exposure detection,
- b. Cooperative Airborne Surveillance through:
 - i. the coordination of joint international aerial atmospheric-sampling missions in regions identified as high-risk for clandestine CBW storage or production, and
 - ii. the provision of shared access to advanced atmospheric dispersion and plume-modelling platforms to allow rapid prediction of

contamination spread and civilian exposure risk
following suspected releases,

- c. A Unified Threat Catalogue, jointly maintained by the OPCW WHO Joint Task Force, including:
 - i. continuously updated databases of precursor chemical combinations, laboratory-grade biological materials, and dual-use components,
 - ii. verified technical profiles of chemical and biological delivery methods used in recent armed conflicts and terrorist incidents, and
 - iii. regularly revised global risk-mapping identifying hotspots of precursor diversion, illicit trafficking routes, and high-risk industrial zones.