

Main Submitter: China

Co-Submitters: Russian Federation, DPRK, Algeria

Signatories: Syria, Cote'd Ivoire, Albania, Canada, Morocco, Finland, Norway, India, Japan, Kenya, Austria, Bolivia, Azerbaijan, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, South Korea, DRC, Malaysia, Italy, Argentina, Philippines.

Topic: Preventing the use of chemical and biological weapons by states in defiance of international prohibition.

Disarmament and International Security,

Recognizing the importance of the Chemical Weapons Convention held in 1993 which enforced the banning of the possession of chemical and biological weapons,

Applauding the efforts of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the leading CBW prevention agency which reinforces CWC protocols via investigation and inspection, alongside their commendable achievement of eradicating all 72,304 metric tonnes worth of CBW stockpiles,

Recalling the importance of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which urges nations to adopt national measures to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destructions, including CBW's, by non-state actors, alongside the pivotal role of the Security Council's Resolution 2118 (2013), which required Syria's chemical weapon programme to be dismantled under the supervision of the OPCW,

Highlighting the importance of upholding the UN principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in regards to inspections and transparency demands,

Being conscious of the ability of chemical weapons to act as a deterrent against foreign intervention,

1. *Incentivizes* all member states to uphold the UN Charter principal of sovereignty and non-interference within any verification regime, ensuring:
 - a. On-site activities such as investigations and inspections are explicitly consented by host-countries, unless enough probable cause is established by a qualified multilateral body that will require:

- i. A formal message to be directed to the suspected state requesting them to accept a clarification visit and investigation,
 - ii. Inability to comply must be clearly explained in formal writing and thoroughly discussed in a BWC or CWC convention, and
 - iii. Investigations to have pre-mandated agreements negotiated circumstantially between the host nation and multilateral body,
 - b. All issues regarding compliance must be directly and firstly addressed within the BWC and CWC framework, avoiding unilateral accusations at all costs;
- 2. *Calls for* the resumption of the Biological Weapons Convention verification measures through a time bound working group on verification under the BWC obligated to:
 - a. Draft a legally binding fair, reasonable, and depoliticized verification protocol,
 - b. Initially globalize confidence building measures, then progressively introduce a CBM form in which State Parties can declare any overseas biological laboratories and high-risk projects, and
 - c. Report annually to State Parties and the United Nations Security Council to oversee progress;
- 3. *Further incentivizes* all members to adopt a Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Act that:
 - a. Criminalizes development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of biological weapons such as:
 - i. Highly pathogenic bacteria,
 - ii. Viruses causing severe disease, and
 - iii. Toxins with lethal capacities such as ricin, botulinum toxin, and saxitoxin,
 - b. Regulates the licensing, approvals, biosafety of high risk biological research projects through the establishment of a licensing authority that is responsible for viewing applications in accordance with strict criteria such as:
 - i. Applicant qualification and past experience, and
 - ii. End-usage and therefore, security measures premeditated to be involved,
 - c. Establishes minimum biosafety standards adhering to the WHO and CDC guidelines for all laboratories involving high-risk biological agents, and
 - d. Requires personnel reliability programs;

4. *Further calls* upon nations to reduce accessibility to high risk biological and chemical agents by enforcing the following:
 - a. Strict licensing and permit systems for possession, transfer, use, and trafficking of high risk chemical and biological agents that are constantly updated in compliance with the UNSCR1540, CWC, and BWC, and
 - b. The constant review of licensing authorities for security guarantees, end use and user verifications, and user track records;
5. *Endorses* the decentralization of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to allow for greater representation in viewpoints espoused in such a forum, through measures including but not restricted to:
 - a. The establishment of thirteen new OPCW branches to have a total of fourteen branches spread throughout all six inhabited continents; and
 - b. The devolution of powers from the central OPCW branch to its new peer branches, such as, but not limited to:
 - i. The conducting of investigations into alleged uses of chemical weapons by states party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and
 - ii. The promotion of chemical sciences and developments in the chemistry world;
6. *Declares accordingly* that the politicization of international non-governmental organizations can only lead to a breakdown in international cooperation and diplomacy, and the prevention of politicization should be prioritized;
7. *Reminds* all nations of the reasons why most countries had chemical weapons, not limited to the following:
 - a. Ambition for expansion and disregard for ethics, seen in nations such as but not limited to:
 - i. The State of Israel,
 - ii. The Kurd Resistance Movement, and
 - iii. The rebel forces in Libya during the 2011 revolution,
 - b. Lack of resources to develop sufficient regular armaments to cover military needs,

- c. Necessity to resort to extreme measures to defend from an aggression, seen in countries such as but not limited to:
 - i. The Arab Republic of Syria, and
 - ii. The national Libyan forces during the 2011 coup,
 - d. Deterrence against foreign intervention, seen in countries such as but not limited to:
 - i. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and
 - ii. Rebels in Yemen,
 - e. Arms race, prestige, and maintenance of power, seen in former countries such as but not limited to:
 - i. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and
 - ii. The United States of America;
8. *Deplores* the hypocrisy of western nations like the United States in the harshness of demands to non-allied nations and its lax approach towards allied nations in various issues, including transparency in disarmament.